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Abstract—Using the interpretation of pronouns in dream and
belief reports as a test case, we show that semantic judgments can
vary as a function of experience. We present findings from three
studies where semantic judgments for pronoun interpretations
were affected by a) repeated exposure, or b) the experimental task
which elicited the judgments. Our findings stress the importance
of converging evidence from multiple tasks and paradigms when
testing and formulating theoretical hypotheses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Previous research has shown that some syntactic and
semantic judgments are affected by the amount of expo-
sure/experience one has with these structures. Syntactic and
semantic acceptability can either decrease or increase as a
function of amount of experience. For example, repeated
exposure to the same words or phrases causes listeners to
temporarily lose its meaning, a phenomenon known as “seman-
tic satiation” [1], [2]. Conversely, the phenomenon sometimes
referred to as “linguist’s disease” or “syntactic satiation”, first
reported in [3], refers to the observation that certain syntactic
structures that were initially judged as ungrammatical slowly
sound grammatical over time [4], [5].
As the literature on syntactic satiation shows, investigating
whether certain linguistic phenomena exhibit a repeated expo-
sure effect or not is important, because the presence or absence
of a repeated exposure effect typically has implications for
theoretical assumptions regarding the architecture of the gram-
mar [6]. The linking assumption here is that structures that
are unacceptable due to a constraint imposed by the grammar
should not exhibit repeated exposure effects.1 The repeated
exposure effect is therefore a litmus test when determining
whether the (un)acceptability of a particular structure is due
to a grammatical constraint or not. In the current study, we
explore the repeated exposure effect in the context of semantic
judgments on pronoun interpretations in dream and belief
reports.
In the discourse in (1), there are four potential readings of
the pronouns in bold, listed in (2).
(1) There were two authors, Carol and Sandra. Carol
dreamed that she was Sandra and she was buying her
book.
1Previous studies have used the term “satiation” irrespective of whether
linguistic acceptability improved (as in the case of syntactic satiation) or
deteriorated (as in the case of semantic satiation). Because the term “satiation”
seems to imply a particular direction of change of linguistic acceptability, we
refrain from using this term for the remainder of this paper.
(2) a. Sandra buys Sandra’s book. (de se + de se)
b. Carol buys Sandra’s book. (de re + de se)
c. Sandra buys Carol’s book. (de se + de re)
d. Carol buys Carol’s book. (de re + de re)
It is claimed, however, that only three of these readings
are attested; the de re + de se reading is claimed to be
ruled out by the so-called ‘Oneiric Reference Constraint’
(ORC) which prohibits the c-command of a de se pronoun
by a corresponding de re pronoun [7]. The ORC is taken to
follow from general syntactic constraints that prevent a binding
configuration from being established in the presence of an
intervening element – in this case, the de re element. The
mechanism underlying the relevant semantic judgments is thus
at root a syntactic one.
Experimental evidence for the ORC is claimed to have been
given in [8]. An experimental paradigm using a novel two-
picture forced-choice task was designed to test the acceptabil-
ity of the de re + de se reading by pitting a picture depicting it
against a picture depicting the de re + de re reading. The items
described scenarios where a de re + de re reading would be
possible but unlikely (e.g., an author buying her own book).
The results showed that while participants preferred a de se
+ de re reading over a de re + de re reading, participants
reliably preferred the de re + de re reading over the de re +
de se reading. This result is interpreted by [8] as evidence that
the de re + de se reading is indeed ruled out by the grammar,
as claimed by [7].
However, we argue that the situation is more complex than
it seems. We have reason to question whether the ORC indeed
holds. In three studies, we show that participants’ judgments
can be modulated as a function of experience. In Study 1,
we reanalyze Experiment 2 reported in [8] and show that
participants reject the de re + de se reading only after a
considerable amount of exposure. In Study 2, using the same
paradigm, we test the ORC with a different verb with coun-
terfactual semantics and demonstrate that participants initially
accept the de re + de se reading but slowly reject it with
increased exposure. Finally in Study 3, we utilize a single-
picture rating task, where participants are not comparing the
appropriateness of two readings simultaneously and choosing
one over the other. In this single-picture paradigm, participants
reliably preferred the de re + de se reading over the de se +
de re reading.
II. STUDY 1: IS THE ORC EFFECT CONSISTENT OVER
TIME?
We reanalyzed Experiment 2 of our previous study [8],
which demonstrated that comprehenders preferred a de re +
de re reading (which describes a possible but unlikely scenario)
over a de re + de se reading (which is supposedly ruled out
by the ORC) when forced to choose between the two. The
purpose of the reanalysis is to investigate whether participants’
judgments were stable during the course of the experiment or
not. If participants reliably reject pictures depicting the de re
+ de se reading throughout the experiment, then this would
constitute strong evidence that this reading is ruled out by
the grammar as claimed by the ORC. If on the other hand,
participants’ judgments change as a function of exposure,
then this would raise the possibility that some other factor
is responsible for the observed effect.
A. Method and Results of Reanalysis
Unlike in [8], we analyzed participants’ semantic judg-
ments using a binary logistic regression model with Com-
parison Type, presentation order, and their interaction, as
predictors.2 Comparison Type is a predictor that has two
values, Comparison Type A (de re + de re vs. de re + de
se) and Comparison Type B (de re + de re vs. de se + de
re), depending on which pair of pictures participants were
presented with. We allowed the model to be adjusted by items,
subjects, and lists, in order to account for random effects.
A significant effect of Comparison Type was observed (z =
−6.26, p < 0.0001), suggesting that the pattern of responses
differed depending on which pair of readings participants
were presented with. We also observed a significant effect of
presentation order (z = 2.48, p = 0.01), indicating that the
proportion of responses changed as a function of exposure.
There was no significant interaction between Comparison Type
and presentation order (z = −1.7, p = 0.07), suggesting that
the pattern of responses changed over time irrespective of
which pair of readings participants were evaluating.
We then applied the split-half method to investigate
whether semantic judgments were consistent throughout the
course of the experiment [9], [10]. The experiment was
originally conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk [11], and
contained 18 experimental items interspersed among 54 fillers.
Since participants had the chance to terminate the experiment
at any time, not all participants saw all 18 experimental items.
Hence, we divided the dataset into two halves, where the “first
half” consisted of experimental items that had Presentation
Orders 1 to 4 (n = 349), and the “second half” consisted
of experimental items that had Presentation Orders 5 to 18
(n = 305). As in [8], we then analyzed both halves using
a binary logistic regression model with Comparison Type as
a predictor. On both halves, there was a significant effect of
Comparison Type (for the first half, z = −7.38, p < 0.0001;
for the second half, z = −8.97, p < 0.0001): the pattern of
judgments was different in both halves when the de re + de re
reading was being compared against the de re + de se reading,
as opposed to against the de se + de re reading.
2We thank the reviewers for the suggestion to incorporate presentation order
in our analyses.
TABLE I. PROPORTIONS OF SEMANTIC ACCEPTABILITY ACROSS FIRST
AND SECOND HALVES FOR EXPERIMENT 2 IN [8]
First Half de re+de re de re+de se de se+de re p-value
Comparison A 48% 51.7% 0.69
Comparison B 9% 90.9% <0.0001
Second Half
Comparison A 64.5% 35.4% <0.0001
Comparison B 7.4% 92.5% <0.0001
Overall
Comparison A 56% 43% 0.02
Comparison B 8% 91% <0.0001
Next, we conducted pairwise T-tests within comparison
type on both halves in order to see whether there were signifi-
cant differences in the proportion of semantic judgments. Table
I shows the distribution of proportions within Comparison
Types A and B on both halves, as well as for the overall
experiment. For the first half, the proportion of responses
in Comparison Type A was not significantly different (t =
0.4, p = 0.69): participants did not exhibit a preference for
one reading over the other. On the other hand, the proportion
of responses in Comparison Type A for the second half was
significantly different (t = −5.26, p < 0.0001). This suggests
that participants only systematically rejected the de re + de se
reading (preferring instead the de re + de re reading, which
describes a possible but unlikely scenario, see 2d above) after
encountering this structure multiple times. The proportion of
responses in Comparison Type B for both halves were both
significantly different (for the first half: t = 22.38, p < 0.0001;
for the second half: t = 28.77, p < 0.0001): when evaluated
against the de se + de re reading, participants systematically
rejected the de re + de re reading throughout the experiment.
B. Discussion
The results of the split-half analysis indicate that a partici-
pant’s experience may be a crucial factor influencing semantic
judgments. While the experiment overall shows a dispreference
for the de re + de se reading, as reported in [8], further
examination of the results reveals that this dispreference is not
immediately manifested. Rather, participants only gradually
develop a dispreference after multiple exposures to pictures
depicting such an interpretation. This finding suggests that
a dispreference for the de re + de se reading may be due
to factors relating to performance or experience, and not (or
perhaps not only) due to stipulations provided by the grammar.
III. STUDY 2: DOES THE ORC EFFECT HOLD WITH
OTHER COUNTERFACTUAL VERBS?
Following ideas first articulated in [12], it is claimed that
the notion of counterfactuality determines the availability of
the de re + de se reading, with recent hypotheses stating
that counterfactual verbs such as dream prohibit it, but non-
counterfactual verbs such as believe allow it [13], [8]. In Study
2, we test this hypothesis further by conducting an experiment
with a different counterfactual verb, replacing dream with
imagine, as in (3). Additionally, as with Study 1, we applied
the split-half method to investigate whether the observed
effects were stable across the duration of the experiment, or
whether participants’ semantic judgments varied as a function
of experience.
(3) There were two authors, Carol and Sandra. Carol
imagined that she was Sandra and she was buying her
book.
A. Method
The materials, pictures, and procedure were identical to
those employed in Experiment 2 in [8], except that the verb
dream was replaced with imagine.
B. Results and Discussion
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk [11] for the experiments
reported in Study 2 and 3. For both experiments, we only
recruited participants with IP addresses based in the United
States. Participants were asked to self-identify as native En-
glish speakers, and data from participants who didn’t were
discarded. The analyses we report below are from the data
provided by the remaining participants.
Participants (n = 104) provided semantic judgments,
which were analyzed using a binary logistic regression model
with Comparison Type, presentation order, and their interac-
tion, as predictors. Additionally, we allowed the model to be
adjusted by items, subjects, and lists, in order to account for
random effects. A significant effect of Comparison Type was
observed (z = −4.53, p < 0.0001), suggesting that the pattern
of responses differed depending on which pair of readings
participants were presented with. Order of presentation was
also a significant predictor (z = 4.49, p < 0.0001), indicating
that the proportion of responses changed as a function of
exposure, as with Study 1. Unlike Study 1, however, we also
observed a significant interaction between Comparison Type
and presentation order (z = −3.00, p = 0.003), suggesting
that the effect of repeated exposure was not identical across
both comparison types.
We then applied the split-half method to probe whether
semantic judgments were consistent throughout the course of
the experiment. We divided the dataset into two halves: the
“first half” consisted of experimental items that had Presenta-
tion Orders 1 to 5 (n = 336), and the “second half” consisted
of experimental items that had Presentation Orders 6 to 18
(n = 348). We analyzed each half separately using a binary
logistic regression model with Comparison Type as a predictor.
On both halves, there was a significant effect of Comparison
Type (for the first half, z = −6.41, p < 0.0001; for the second
half, z = −9.34, p < 0.0001): as with Study 1, the pattern of
judgments was different in both halves when the de re + de re
reading was being compared against the de re + de se reading,
as opposed to against the de se + de re reading.
We then conducted pairwise T-tests within comparison type
on both halves to see whether there were significant differences
in the proportion of semantic judgments. Table II summarizes
the proportion of semantic acceptability per condition across
first and second halves, as well as for the overall experiment.
For both halves, the proportion of responses in Comparison
Type A was significantly different (for the first half, t =
2.67, p = 0.01; for the second half, t = −4.88, p < 0.0001):
participants exhibited a preference for one reading over the
other. Crucially, however, the direction of preference differed
between the first and second halves: while participants signif-
icantly preferred the de re + de se reading in the first half, the
TABLE II. PROPORTIONS OF SEMANTIC ACCEPTABILITY ACROSS
FIRST AND SECOND HALVES FOR STUDY 2
First Half de re+de re de re+de se de se+de re p-value
Comparison A 41% 58% 0.01
Comparison B 8.8% 91% <0.0001
Second Half
Comparison A 63.8% 36.1% <0.0001
Comparison B 4.8% 95.1% <0.0001
Overall
Comparison A 51.9% 48% 0.46
Comparison B 6.7% 93.2% <0.0001
opposite was true in the second half. Finally, the proportion
of responses in Comparison Type B for both halves were both
significantly different, and in the same direction of preference
(for the first half, t = 25.05, p < 0.0001; for the second half,
t = 37.76, p < 0.0001): participants systematically rejected
the de re + de re reading throughout the experiment.
The results of Study 2 provide further evidence of how
semantic judgments can be affected by one’s experiences.
Using a different counterfactual verb, we have shown that
participants’ judgments on the acceptability of various pronoun
interpretations can change as a function of continued and
repeated exposure to the stimulus in question. The experiment
overall shows that when forced to choose between a de re + de
re and a de re + de se reading, participants are equally likely
to choose either reading. However, a closer look at the pattern
of results across time shows that participants initially preferred
the de re + de se reading. Only after prolonged exposure did
participants’ judgments reverse, showing a preference for the
de re + de re reading. In the context of theories that predict
the unacceptability of the de re + de se reading by virtue
of a grammatical stipulation, this pattern of results calls for
explanation.
IV. STUDY 3: IS THE ORC EFFECT OBSERVED WITH
OTHER EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGMS?
The previous studies used a two-picture forced-choice task
to elicit semantic judgments. One potential confound that this
paradigm raises, however, is that the semantic judgments that
participants provided for a particular reading were always
relative to another reading. In other words, in this paradigm,
participants’ choices essentially indicated which of the two
readings were preferred, but preference for one reading over
the other does not automatically mean that the dispreferred
reading is unacceptable. In Study 3, we addressed this issue by
utilizing a single-picture rating task. Instead of comparing two
potential readings and indicating which reading they preferred,
participants simply provided ratings of semantic acceptability
on single pictures. Participants therefore are not explicitly
asked to entertain two potential readings at the same time.
In addition to the change in experimental paradigm, this
study also attempted to investigate the role of counterfactuality
and its potential effect on the (un)availability of the de re + de
se reading. As mentioned earlier, recent hypotheses state that
counterfactual verbs such as dream and imagine prohibit this
reading, but non-counterfactual verbs like believe and claim
allow it. We experimentally address this hypothesis in the
current study to investigate if there are systematic differences
in semantic judgments between these two verb types.
TABLE III. MEAN RESPONSES (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN
PARENTHESES) OF SEMANTIC ACCEPTABILITY PER VERB TYPE AND TYPE
OF READING IN STUDY 3
Type of reading
Type of verb de re+de se de se+de re
Counterfactual 6.03 (1.41) 5.33 (1.98)
Non-counterfactual 6.1 (1.24) 5.03 (2.21)
A. Method
The materials and pictures were identical to those em-
ployed in Study 2, except that we used 4 counterfactual
verbs (dream, imagine, pretend, wish) and 4 non-counterfactual
verbs (believe, think, say, claim), interspersed among 32 filler
items, presented randomly. All of the verbs used in the test
and filler items appeared only once in the course of the
experiment, thereby preventing participants from forming verb-
based response strategies due to multiple exposures. Unlike in
Study 2, it was not possible to terminate the experiment until
all 40 items were completed.
Participants were given discourses similar to (1) and (3)
and were instructed to rate on a 7-point Likert scale how well
the discourse matched the picture that was provided with it.
The test items were presented either with a picture depicting
the de re + de se or de se + de re reading. Half of the filler
items were presented with a mismatching entity or object, so
that there was expected to be a clear answer as to whether
the picture fit the story or not, allowing us to determine if
participants were paying attention to the task. The experiment
was counterbalanced into 4 lists, such that for each test item,
participants were only presented with one of the two potential
readings.
B. Results and Discussion
60 participants provided semantic judgments, which were
analyzed using a linear mixed-effects regression model, with
counterfactuality, reading type, order of presentation, and their
interactions, as fixed factors. We allowed the model to be
adjusted by items, subjects, and lists, in order to account for
random effects. Means and standard deviations of responses
per condition are provided in Table III. The model revealed
a main effect of reading type (t = −2.35, p = 0.01):
pictures depicting the de re + de se reading were rated
as more acceptable than pictures depicting the de se + de
re reading. There was no main effect of counterfactuality
(t = −0.07, p = 0.94): acceptability ratings did not differ
as a function of counterfactuality. Unlike the previous two
experiments, however, there was no effect of presentation order
(t = −0.29, p = 0.76). Finally, there were no significant
interactions (all ps > 0.05).
The results of Study 3 further illustrate how semantic
acceptability judgments can be affected by the way these
judgments are elicited. Unlike in Study 1 and 2, participants
did not evaluate two potential readings and picked the more
acceptable reading. Study 3 only presented participants with
one reading to entertain at a time, and in this paradigm,
participants exhibited a higher acceptability for the de re + de
se reading than the de se + de re reading. It is also worth noting
that the average scores for both readings were relatively high
(all conditions were 5 or higher in a 7-point scale), suggesting
that participants overall deemed both readings as acceptable.
These results are inconsistent with theories predicting that the
de re + de se reading is unacceptable due to grammatical
stipulations.
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the three studies reported here illustrate how
semantic judgments can be influenced by one’s experience. Our
studies have shown that judgments of semantic acceptability
can vary depending on the amount of exposure, as well as
on the way these judgments are elicited. Our results pattern
with recent studies on behavioral responses to syntactic and
semantic stimuli, which demonstrated that a) one’s syntactic
parsing preferences can change in the course of a single
experiment by simply manipulating the statistical distribution
of frequent and non-frequent structures [14], [15]; and that
b) even online behavioral responses to semantic priming
paradigms can be prone to strategic effects that are allowed
by the composition of the experiment [16]. The results of the
studies we report highly suggest that the semantic acceptability
judgments we elicited is not only affected by relatively stable
knowledge of the grammar of the language, but also by factors
pertaining to exposure: how often these judgments are elicited
in an elicitation session, and the task employed to elicit these
judgments. Our studies illustrate how one’s experience affects
semantic judgments: semantic judgments changed as a function
of repetition, as well as of presentation.
Reviewers have drawn our attention to potential problems
with the split-halves analyses we implemented in Study 1 and
2. Due to the design of the experiments, the participants in
both halves are not identical (the participants in the second
half form a proper subset of the participants in the first half).
It was suggested instead to simply use order of presentation
as a gradient variable. As reported above, we implemented
this suggestion, and as expected, presentation order was a
significant predictor in both Study 1 and 2. However, we
believe that dividing the acceptability judgments in halves
provides at least a coarse-grained index allowing us to see
how semantic judgments change as a function of exposure. As
Tables I and II show, the unacceptability of the de re + de se
reading only emerges in the second half. Even if we discard
the second halves of Study 1 and 2, the data comprising the
first halves indicate that there is no dispreference for the de re
+ de se reading. In fact, the first half of Study 2 even shows
that this reading is preferred.
Our findings have potentially serious implications for the-
ories of pronoun interpretation that appeal to grammatical
stipulations. Theories that predict the unacceptability of the
de re + de se reading by virtue of a grammatical rule
would be hard-pressed to explain our results, which showed
that this reading was in fact not only acceptable but also
preferred given certain conditions. While we do not claim
that our studies provide definitive evidence against the Oneiric
Reference Constraint, we believe that there is enough evidence
to state that the (un)acceptability of this reading is modulated
by multiple factors in addition to grammatical rules.
Our results stress how important it is to be aware of
numerous factors that affect linguistic judgments. While re-
searchers who work solely in a theoretical domain may draw
a line between linguistic knowledge/competence and linguistic
performance, linguistic behavior may be affected by both
linguistic and non-linguistic factors – a possibility that must
be taken into consideration in experimentally-oriented research
[17], [18]. This point carries particular significance when the
goal is to formulate theoretical hypotheses on the basis of
experimental evidence. Our findings illustrate the importance
of converging evidence from multiple tasks and paradigms
when testing and formulating theoretical hypotheses.
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